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Constitutional Law-A VOYAGE THROUGH MURKY WATERS:
ASSESSING FLAG MISUSE PROHIBITIONS IN THE WAKE OF Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)
DEBORAH TULLY EVERSOLE
N Texas v. Johnson,' the United States Supreme Court held that
Gregory Johnson's conviction for burning an American flag in po-
litical protest violated his first amendment right to free speech. 2 The
ruling caused a coast-to-coast uproar;3 hordes of politicians4 immedi-
ately began to press for a constitutional amendment and/or statute
banning flag desecration,5 while others rallied to defend what they
perceived to be the Court's unqualified defense of political dissent. 6
1. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Johnson was a 5-4 decision. Justices Scalia, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined the majority opinion which was written by Justice Brennan. Justice Kennedy
concurred "without reservation." Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented with an opinion in which Justices White and O'Connor joined. Id. at 2548-55 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting); Justice Stevens dissented separately. Id. at 2555-57 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
2. Id. at 2548. The first amendment's provision for freedom of speech has been applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment since the 1920s. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); W.
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 43 (1984).
3. See Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 25, 1989, at 10A, col. I (citing Americans' "outrage"
at an "outrageous act"). The Johnson controversy even appeared in a letter to the editor of TV
Guide, Sept. 16, 1989, at 120, col. 1 ("In a country where people are allowed to burn the na-
tional flag, I think pro-American [subliminal television] messages are the least of our prob-
lems").
4. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at A16, col. 1 ("The first impassioned days after the
Supreme Court's ruling, lawmakers lined up in the House and the Senate to denounce flag burn-
ing and the Court's decision.").
5. Even before the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson, one commentator argued that the
Court has exceeded its authority in liberalizing the application of the Bill of Rights, thus result-
ing in an effort by the political majority to "restore" the laws through constitutional amend-
ments. See Markman, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Amendments, in STUL THE LAW OF
TFIE LAND? ESSAYS ON CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONsTrUTION 79-96 (J. McNamara &
L. Rothe eds. 1987).
Charles J. Cooper, former head of the office of legal counsel in the Department of Justice,
believes that a constitutional amendment is absolutely necessary to protect the flag. Nat'l L. J.,
Nov. 13, 1989 at 33, col. 2. Among those who join Cooper in calling for a constitutional amend-
ment are Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, Repub., Kan., N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at
A16, col. 2, and former U.S. Appeals Court Judge Robert Bork, who declared that the Congress
cannot "overturn a decision like this by statute," Cong. Q. at 2558, Sept. 2, 1989, col. 2.
6. The following statement appeared in the Miami Herald: "Rather than pass any bill at
all, Congress should have defended the Supreme Court decision .... (Tihe President and the
Congress apparently were eager to stand up for the flag, but were unwilling to stand up for the
principles that the flag itself stands for." A Log on the Fire, Miami Herald, Oct. 15, 1989, at
C2, col. 2.
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Johnson crystallized the conflict between those who would preserve
the physical integrity of the flag, even at the cost of narrower first
amendment protections, and those who would defend with equal ve-
hemence their first amendment freedom to dissent, even by burning
the flag. That so many people would perceive a conflict between the
flag and the Constitution it represents is ironic; even more ironic is the
popular perception that the controversy between flag sanctifiers and
first amendment defenders is a battle between the patriotic and the
blasphemous.
The ideal resolution of this clash would be a recognition that the
flag represents the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but that
the right to dissent-even by burning the flag-is one of those free-
doms and consequently should be protected. 7 Carving out an excep-
tion to first amendment freedom of speech for flag misuse does no
honor to the flag; rather, it creates a dangerous precedent likely to
spawn further exceptions to an essential freedom. Permitting protes-
ters to burn flags does nothing to destroy the flag's power as a sym-
bol. Indeed, freedom to burn the flag enhances the flag's symbolic
power, since the government's refusal to retain absolute control over
the use of its symbols underscores its commitment to freedom of
thought.8 The Supreme Court in Johnson said as much: "We are
tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place in
our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding
today."9
Nevertheless, Johnson has resulted in confusion, partly because of
the controversy it generated and partly because of the limiting lan-
guage found in footnote three of the opinion. 0 This language, which
has been characterized as a loophole, has led some scholars to claim
that Johnson does not protect all instances of the use of the flag in
political protest." Until the Supreme Court clarifies its holding, the
government will continue to prosecute those who desecrate the flag.
7. Id.
8. "It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt."
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 2547.
10. Id. at 2538-39 n.3. The Court chose to restrict its ruling to the issue of Gregory John-
son's first amendment rights under the Texas statute. The Court expressly chose not to decide
whether persons who desecrated the flag without expressing an idea could be prosecuted. Id. For
the text of footnote three, see infra note 148.
11. See Tribe, Give Old Glory a Break: Protect It-And Ideas, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at
A18 ("Properly understood, the Court's decision upheld no right to desecrate the flag, even in
political protest, but merely required that Government protection of the flag be separated from
Government suppression of detested views."). Testifying before the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee, Professor Walter Dellinger stated, "[A] simple act of Congress 'protecting the physical
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This Note demonstrates how, despite the controversy, Johnson fits
within a pattern of first amendment jurisprudence established by the
Supreme Court, a pattern by which the Supreme Court found Texas'
two interests-prevention of breach of the peace and protection of the
flag as symbol-insufficient to override Gregory Johnson's first
amendment rights. The Note briefly discusses the loophole created by
footnote three of Johnson and highlights the controversy and political
maneuvering which has resulted in a new federal flag protection stat-
ute.12 Finally, this Note argues that, by failing to state unequivocally
in Johnson that the government may not compel respect for the sym-
bols it establishes, the Supreme Court's level of protection fell short
of the constitutional standards for protected speech established by the
Court. 3
I. THE FACTS: GREGORY JOHNSON BURNS A FLAG
On August 22, 1984, in Dallas, Texas, Gregory Johnson burned an
American flag as part of a demonstration against the Reagan Admin-
istration and several Dallas-based corporations.' 4 The Republican
Party was holding its national convention, so Johnson and his fellow
demonstrators were assured of publicity. 5 The flag burning culmi-
integrity of the flag in all circumstances' . . . would not necessarily be inconsistent with the
Court's opinion in Texas v. Johnson." Flag Desecration and the Constitution, Legal Times, July
24, 1989, at 18 [hereinafter Flag Desecration and the Constitution].
12. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. - (amending 18 U.S.C
§ 700). Section 2(a) of the Act reads:
(a)(l) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains
upon the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag
when it has become worn or soiled.
13. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court
held that the underlying principles of our government preclude the government from compelling
respect for established symbols by forcing participation in prescribed rituals: "The use of an
emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from
mind to mind." Id. at 632. The Court reasoned that coercing participation in rituals of respect
for governmental symbols amounts to coercing acceptance of a patriotic creed, id. at 634, and
since no such coercive power exists under the Constitution, children could not be forced to salute
the flag, id. at 642. The Court noted the rational/emotional conflict of such a decision: "The
case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag
involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social
organization." Id. at 641.
14. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2536.
15. Id. Johnson and his fellow demonstrators took full advantage of the politically charged
atmosphere. The more memorable sentiments delivered by the protesters include: "Ronald Re-
agan, killer of the hour, perfect example of U.S. power," id. at 2553, and "America, the red,
white and blue, we spit on you," id. at 2536.
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nated a march during which the demonstrators chanted, spray-painted
buildings, overturned potted plants, and staged "die-ins" calculated
to impress onlookers with the consequences of nuclear war.16 Johnson
took no part in the vandalism; however, he accepted an American flag
stolen by another protestor, doused the flag with kerosene, and set it
on fire in front of the arena where the Republican National Conven-
tion was meeting. 17
Approximately one hundred people participated in the various pro-
test activities, but no one was physically injured or threatened with
injury. 18 Only Gregory Johnson was arrested; he was charged not with
theft or vandalism, but with desecration of a venerated object in vio-
lation of section 42.09 of the Texas Penal Code. 19
Johnson was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a year in prison and
a $2,000 fine.2 0 He appealed, arguing that the Texas statute was un-
constitutionally vague, overbroad, and violative of his right to free
speech under the first and fourteenth amendments.2 1 The Texas Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court conviction. It rejected Johnson's
vagueness argument, finding the relevant statutory terms "deface"
and "damage" to be well-understood terms. 22 The court also rejected
Johnson's argument that the statute was overbroad, reasoning that
the statute "in no way prohibited legitimate protest activities." 3 Find-
ihg that Johnson's conduct was indeed the equivalent of political
speech, and was likely to be understood by onlookers as a political
expression, the court applied first amendment scrutiny to Johnson's
claim.24 It concluded that Texas' interests in preventing breaches of
16. Id.
17. Id. An offended spectator retrieved the charred remnants of the flag and buried them in
his back yard. Id.
18. Id. at 2537. However, several witnesses testified that they had been "seriously offended
by the flag burning." Id.
19. Id. The statute under which Johnson was prosecuted reads:
Section 42.09. Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
TEx. PENAL. CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
20. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537.
21. Johnson v. Texas, 706 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 92
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 123.
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the peace and protecting the flag as a symbol of national unity justi-
fied abridging Johnson's right to dissent. 25 According to the court,
such an abridgement was permissible because flag desecration is so
inherently inflammatory that a state may forbid it to prevent a breach
of the peace. 26 The court held also that a state has a legitimate right to
preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity. 27
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with
those conclusions, and reversed the trial court and lower appellate
court.28 Addressing Texas' breach of peace interest, the Court of
Criminal Appeals found the statute so broad that the state could use it
to punish protected conduct not apt to result in a breach of the
peace; 29 the court added that Johnson's acts had not threatened such a
breach.a0
The court then rejected Texas' second argument, that the state has a
legitimate interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national
unity.3 Distinguishing the facts of West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette,12 the Court analogized Texas' interest in the flag as a sym-
bol of national unity to West Virginia's goal of national unity in re-
quiring children to salute the flag.33 The court noted that Barnette
requires that a state interest be in "grave and immediate danger" to
warrant abridging an activity protected by the first amendment.3 4 To
25. Id. at 123-24.
26. Id. at 123. On the same day Johnson burned an American flag, demonstrators else-
where in Dallas burned a foreign flag; that particular flag burning resulted in a brawl. Johnson
v. Texas, 755 S.W.2d 92, 94 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub. nom. Texas v. Johnson, 109
S. Ct. 2533 (1989). No one involved in the foreign flag burning, which resulted in violence, was
arrested under the Texas statute, id., despite the fact that the Texas statute provides that dese-
cration of any "national flag" is an offense. TEX. PENAL. CODE ANN. § 42.09 (b) (Vernon 1989).
Apparently, selective enforcement problems may exist with the Texas statute. For the text of the
statute, see supra note 19.
27. Johnson v. State, 706 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 92
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub. nom. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
The court apparently ignored West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), under which the State has no legitimate interest in compelling respect for a symbol estab-
lished by the government. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
28. Johnson 755 S.W.2d at 98.
29. Id. at 96.
30. Id. at 97. The court did not declare that the statute was, on its face, unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, but only that it was unconstitutional as applied to Johnson's first amend-
ment rights. Id.; see also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989).
31. Johnson, 755 S.W.2d at 96.
32. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33. Johnson, 755 S.W.2d at 95.
34. Id. at 97. The Barnette Court stated:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far
as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a
legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and
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determine whether the state's interest meets this requirement, the
court would examine the propriety of the interest and compare it to
the immediacy of the danger to that interest." Finding that no danger
was present to the flag as a symbol, the court rejected Texas' second
interest, reversed the lower decisions, and held that Texas could not
use the flag protection statute to punish flag desecration "when such
conduct falls within the protection of the First Amendment."3 6
Warning that the State cannot control expression associated with
the flag, the court added:
Recognizing that the right to differ is at the centerpiece of our First
Amendment freedoms, a government cannot mandate by fiat a
feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government
cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved
messages to be associated with that symbol when it cannot mandate
the status or feeling the symbol purports to represent.3 7
The court chose not to address the question of whether the statute
could be used to prohibit acts of flag desecration deemed not to be
speech under the first amendment."
The Texas statute survived, but the court had severely curtailed its
usefulness. Texas appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certi-
orari; then, to the shock and outrage of many, the Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal of Johnson's conviction. 39
II. THE RELEVANT DOCTRINES
Texas v. Johnson is not the first case in which the Supreme Court
has dealt with flag misuse. In each of the previous cases, though, the
Court was able to decriminalize the disputed conduct without directly
addressing the question of whether flag desecration as protest is con-
stitutionally protected. In 1969, for example, the Court reversed a flag
press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to in-
terests which the state may lawfully protect.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639 (quoted in Johnson, 755 S.W.2d at 95 n.7).
35. Johnson, 755 S.W.2d at 97.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals thus left open the possibility that some acts of
flag desecration might be punishable. The Supreme Court also left open the same possibility. See
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 n.3. (1989) ("[B]ecause we are capable of disposing of
this case on narrower grounds, we address only Johnson's claim that § 42.09 as applied to politi-
cal expression like his violates the First Amendment.").
39. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
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burner's conviction in Street v. New York"" because of the possibility
that he was convicted for words he spoke while committing the act.4'
The Court did not address the constitutionality of flag burning in po-
litical protest.4 Five years later, in Spence v. Washington,43 the Court
reversed the conviction of a protestor who had displayed a flag upside
down with a peace symbol affixed. The Court noted that the appellant
had not been charged under the desecration statute, nor had he "per-
manently" destroyed or disfigured the flag.44 Finally, in Smith v. Go-
guen,4 the Court ruled that a person who had worn a small flag sewn
to the seat of his pants could not be punished for casting contempt on
the flag, on the basis that the proscription was void for vagueness.4
In Texas v. Johnson, however, the issue of whether burning a fjag
in protest is protected speech was squarely presented. Many people
were shocked by the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson; yet, the
constitutional standards used by the Court to reverse Gregory John-
son's conviction were neatly in place long before the flagburning oc-
curred.4 7 In fact, only by ignoring precedent could the Supreme Court
have ruled otherwise. A brief outline of the first amendment doctrines
upon which the Supreme Court relied in Johnson demonstrates the
reasoning behind the Court's decision.
A. The Pure Speech Standard: Brandenburg v. Ohio
Brandenburg v. Ohio4 established the modern standard for the pro-
tection of pure speech: 49 a state may outlaw speech only when that
40. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
41. Id. at 590.
42. Id. at 594.
43. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
44. Id. at 415.
45. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
46. Id. at 582.
47. One commentator predicted in 1975 that flag desecration statutes purporting to prohibit
ideological acts would be declared unconstitutional. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1482, 1502-03 (1975). Another commentator predicted that case law would permit the Court to
hold that "all noncommercial, unorthodox use of the flag is protected by the first amendment."
See Note, Flag Misuse and the First Amendment: Spence v. Washington, 50 WAsH. L. REv. 169,
170 (1974). The actual holding of Johnson is not so broad, however, and appears to be consis-
tent with the philosophy of Professor Leahy, who stated that in flag misuse cases the right of
free expression clashes with "governmental interests which require protection." Leahy, Flam-
boyant Protest: The First Amendment and the Boston Tea Party, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 185, 205
(1970). Professor Leahy exhorts legislators to draw statutes narrowly so as not to unnecessarily
infringe upon first amendment rights. Id. at 211.
48. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
49. Pure speech may be defined as expression which is free of overt actions. As Justice
1990]
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speech is directed to "inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to produce such action." 50 This stringent test demands
not only that the speaker direct his listeners to perform unlawful acts,
but that the performance of the unlawful acts be imminent." Unless
the conditions of this test are met, the speech is protected under the
first amendment. The Brandenburg standard thus presents a nearly
insurmountable obstacle to government prosecution for speech.12 Nev-
ertheless, the Brandenburg strictures can be avoided: under United
States v. O'Brien," the government may impose restrictions when the
speech is symbolic54 and the State has a legitimate interest in regulat-
Douglas explained, "The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what
may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts."
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). Symbolic speech, however, may be
"akin to pure speech" and thus protected under the first amendment. Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing of armbands in symbolic protest
within the protection of the first amendment).
50. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. This immediacy requirement incorporates the "clear and
present danger" requirement articulated by the Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) and eloquently defined eight years later by Justice Brandeis as an "incidence of...
evil so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion." Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Note, however, that Justice
Brandeis' high standards were not incorporated into first amendment jurisprudence until rela-
tively recently. The Court found clear and present danger in Schenck, and upheld the conviction
of World War I protesters who distributed pamphlets urging citizens to resist the draft. Schenck,
249 U.S. at 53. In Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 217 (1919), the Court upheld the convic-
tion of Eugene Debs, a socialist presidential candidate who had merely given an antiwar speech
to a general audience. One scholar commented that convicting Debs was "somewhat as though
George McGovern had been sent to prison for his criticism of the [Vietnam] war." Kalven,
Ernest Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. Cm. L. Rv. 235, 237 (1973).
51. In Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446, the Court decriminalized the speech of a Ku Klux
Klan member who threatened "revengeance" at a filmed rally. The speech was "mere advo-
cacy", id. at 449, and was thus protected by the first amendment, since the threatened violence
was not imminent. Id. For further discussion on imminent danger of violence as a restriction on
free speech, see infra note I11.
1 52. For example, in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), the Court reversed the conviction
of a protestor who yelled, as the police cleared the street of demonstrators "We'll take the fuck-
ing street later" or "We'll take the fucking street again." Id. at 107. Citing Brandenburg, the
Court held that the threatened illegal activity was not imminent: Hess' speech was, "at worst,
... nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time." Id. at 108.
Even more strikingly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Court
declared that boycott organizer Charles Evers' public statements that boycott violators' "necks
would be broken" and that the "sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night," id. at
927, were protected by the first amendment, id. at 929, even though violence against boycott
violators subsequently occurred, id. at 897. Perhaps Evers would have been liable, the Court
said, if "unlawful conduct [had] in fact followed within a reasonable period." Id. at 926. The
violence occurred "weeks or months" after Evers' speech. Id. at 928. There was "no evidence-
apart from the speeches themselves-that Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts
of violence." Id. at 929.
53. 391 U.S. 367 (1967).
54. Symbolic speech exists when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
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ing the conduct involved." Under Cantwell v. Connecticut,16 the gov-
ernment may intervene when listeners or observers react so violently
to the message that an uncontrollable breach of peace is imminent. 7
B. The Symbolic Speech Standard: United States v. O'Brien
United States v. O'Brien" permits the states to regulate expressive
conduct under the following conditions: (1) the regulation must be
within the government's constitutional power; (2) the regulation must
further an important or substantial government interest; (3) that inter-
est must not be related to the suppression of free expression; and (4)
the resulting restriction of expression must be no greater than neces-
sary to further that interest. 59
David O'Brien was convicted for burning his draft card.60 Despite
the obvious political message of his act, the Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction because the government could establish a legitimate in-
terest-"assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Serv-
ice certificates" -that did not relate to the suppression of free
expression'.6 The Court thus separated the conduct element of the of-
fense from its speech element and declared that O'Brien was convicted
for the "noncommunicative element of his conduct, and for nothing
else." 62 The Court rejected O'Brien's argument that the actual pur-
pose of the draft card statute was to suppress freedom of speech 63 and
refused to "strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the ba-
sis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."64
Burning a flag in protest bears a striking resemblance to burning a
draft card in protest; however, the Johnson Court did not find that
Texas had based its prosecution on any conduct separable from the
speech element of Johnson's flag burning. Instead, the Court held
that the prosecution of Johnson, unlike the prosecution of O'Brien,
was aimed solely at supressing the expression. 6
same course of conduct." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (burning a draft card to protest a war as
symbolic speech); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (wearing a black armband to school as symbolic speech).
55. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
56. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
57. Id. at 308.
58. 391 U.S. 367 (1967).
59. Id. at 377.
60. Id. at 370 (O'Brien wished to influence others to "adopt his antiwar beliefs.").
61. Id. at 382.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 382-83.
64. Id. at 383.
65. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989).
1990]
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C. The Breach of Peace Interest as a Limitation on Freedom of
Speech
Another way the government may avoid the Brandenburg limitation
on the State's authority to restrict speech is by establishing that the
speaker was inciting a serious breach of the peace. In Cantwell v.
Connecticut,6 the Court held that the State's legitimate interest in pre-
serving order must be weighed against the speaker's right to express
himself freely. 67 Newton Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness, had so of-
fended two Catholics by playing a recording of an anti-Catholic dia-
tribe that they were "tempted to strike [him] unless he went away.' '68
Cantwell obliged them by going away, 69 however, and since no "clear
and present menace to public peace and order ' 70 existed, the Court
reversed Cantwell's conviction for invoking or inciting others to
breach the peace. 71
The Court refined the Cantwell balancing test in Terminiello v. Chi-
cago,72 which involved a more explosive situation. 73 Terminiello gave a
speech in a closed auditorium while a furious mob raged outside. 74
Imparting some remarkable tidbits of inflammatory "information,"
Terminiello said, among other things, that Eleanor Roosevelt and
66. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
67. Id. at 307. The Court thus introduced a balancing test for situations in which the
speaker incites listeners to breach of the peace.
The use of this test in a first amendment context has been roundly criticized. In Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951), Communist party members were convicted of advocat-
ing overthrow of the government. No imminent danger of breach of the peace existed; neverthe-
less, the Court balanced the weight of a perceived evil-the advocacy of violent overthrow of the
government-against the right of the citizens involved to speak freely. Id. at 509. The weight of
the perceived evil tipped the scale. Id. at 511. One commentator charged that Dennis ignored
central first amendment values by permitting suppression virtually without evidence of any ac-
tual or imminent danger. See W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 2, at 35. Justice Douglas wrote that
Dennis distorted the clear and present danger test beyond recognition. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 453 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). Professor Ely argued that "balancing tests
inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing."
Ely, supra note 47, at 1501 (citing McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1182, 1203-12 (1959)). In his dissent to Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), Justice
Black declared that the "First Amendment's unequivocal command ... shows that the men who
drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field." Id. at 61
(Black, J., dissenting).
68. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 311.
71. Id. at 303.
72. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id. at 2-3. Terminiello was compared by his admirers to Father Coughlin, a well-known
demagogue. Id. at 14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Henry Wallace advocated communist revolution,75 and that the
"howling mob outside" wished to instigate rape, murder, and slav-
ery. 76 Despite the danger of the situation and Terminiello's deliberate
exacerbation of that danger, the Court reversed his conviction for
breach of the peace, declaring that while the freedom to speak is not
absolute, it is protected unless shown likely to produce "a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 77
The Terminiello decision was a powerful statement in favor of un-
trammeled expression. 7 However, only two years later in Feiner v.
New York, 79 the Court found that a "clear and present danger" ex-
isted when a speaker made derogatory remarks about President Tru-
man and urged African-Americans to fight for their civil rights.8 0 The
perceived danger there consisted of traffic obstruction, the crowd's
mixed reactions, and one man's threat to do violence "if the police
did not act."'" A police officer arrested Feiner when he refused to end
his speech.8 2 Affirming Feiner's conviction, the Supreme Court cited
Cantwell: "When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interfer-
ence with traffic upon the public streets or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to pre-
vent or punish is obvious." '83
A subsequent case, Gregory v. Chicago,84 involved a school desegre-
gation march. Although the marchers were orderly, the police were
75. Id. at 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Justice Jackson warned, though, that "if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic
with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact." Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson maintained that the choice is not
between order and liberty: "It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either." Id.
79. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
80. Id. at 317.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 318.
83. Id. at 320 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)). Thus, in a
crowd-control situation, the test is whether the threat of uncontrollable violence from the listen-
ers sufficiently justifies convicting a speaker who refuses a police officer's request to stop speak-
ing. The sufficiency of the threat is, to some extent, subject to judicial discretion.
Justice Black wrote an angry dissent to Feiner, calling the decision "a mockery of . . . free
speech guarantees" in which he would have "no part or parcel." Id. at 323 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). But Justice Black did not dissent on the principle that the State should never be permitted
to punish a speaker who continues to speak despite actual police inability to control the listeners;
rather, he dissented on the facts of the case, declaring it "far-fetched to suggest that the 'facts'
show any imminent threat of riot or uncontrollable disorder." Id. at 325. Justice Black declared
that, moreover, if a breach of peace threatens, the first duty of the police is to protect the
speaker "even to the extent of arresting [anyone] who threatens to interfere." Id. at 327.
84. 394 U.S. 111 (1969). Concurring in a second opinion, Justice Black once more asserted
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unable to restrain, "within decent and orderly bounds," hecklers hos-
tile to the marchers.85 After the marchers ignored a police order to
disband, they were arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct.8 6 The
Court reversed the conviction on narrow grounds, holding that the
city had brought the wrong charge.8 7 Despite the narrow ruling, Gre-
gory limited the State's perogative under Cantwell to restrict speech
by requiring a greater showing of potential crowd violence.
In contrast to Cantwell, Terminiello, and Gregory, all of which in-
volved at least some threat of violence, stands Cohen v. California.88
Cohen illustrates the Court's position on speech that lacks such a
threat. Cohen expressed his political sentiments in a novel way: he
wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." 9 Rejecting the
argument that Cohen's mode of expression was too outrageously of-
fensive to be borne, the Court reversed his conviction and tersely sug-
gested that onlookers might "effectively avoid further bombardment
of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes."9o
III. TEXAS V. JOHNSON: THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The State attempted to avoid the protective Brandenburg standard
by arguing, first, that it had a legitimate interest in preventing
breaches of the peace, 9' and second, that it had a legitimate interest in
his commitment to freedom of speech, but added that "[tihe constitutional guarantee of liberty
implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty
itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy." Id. at 125 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)).
85. Id. at 117 (Black, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 112.
87. Id. at 112-13. The Court stated that the conviction for disorderly conduct lacked evi-
dentiary support and violated due process. The proper charge would have been "refusal to obey
a police officer," the Court said, noting that neither the ordinance nor the charge defined disor-
derly conduct as the refusal to obey a police officer. Presumably, if either ordinance or charge
had so defined disorderly conduct, the conviction might have been affirmed.
In passing, the Court added that the trial judge's charge independently required reversal be-
cause it permitted the jury to convict for acts clearly entitled to first amendment protection. Id.
at 113 (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)). The jury had been instructed to
"ignore questions concerning the acts of violence committed by the crowd of onlookers and
attempts made by the police to arrest those directly responsible for them." Id. at 122-23 (Black,
J., concurring). The jury was allowed to convict if it found that the marchers had made an
"improper noise" or a "diversion tending to a breach of the peace," or had "collect[ed] in
bodies or crowds for unlawful purposes, or for any purpose, to the annoyance or disturbance of
other persons." Id. at 122. The Court could not let such a jury instruction stand. When evidence
of onlooker violence is central to the question of whether those who incited it will be prosecuted,
a jury cannot be permitted to ignore that evidence.
88. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 21.
91. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (1989).
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preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity.9 2 The Supreme
Court, like the Texas Court of Appeals, rejected both interests.
The Court first focused on the dichotomy between speech and con-
duct: under Brandenburg, constitutionally permissible prosecution for
pure speech is rare, but conduct, even though it may express an idea,93
is not so strongly protected.9 Johnson's conviction, like that of the
draft card burner in O'Brien, purportedly resulted from what he did
rather than what he said.95 Texas hoped to establish that its case
against Johnson fit into the O'Brien requirements, i.e., that prohibit-
ing flag desecration was legitimately within its power; that the statute
was aimed not at suppression of speech, but at the prohibition of con-
duct; and that the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.
Texas failed. The Court concluded that Texas' interest in preserving
the flag as a symbol of national unity was indeed aimed at the sup-
pression of speech9 and that the O'Brien standard did not apply.9 7
A. Preventing Breaches of the Peace
The Court then analyzed Texas' claim that its interest in preventing
a breach of the peace justified its conviction of Johnson.98 In keeping
with precedent, 99 the Court considered the sufficiency of this interest
as a matter of fact rather than declaring that, as a matter of law, the
state may not silence speakers to prevent violence by others.1'° This
breach of peace exception to the right of free expression is extremely
narrow-so narrow, in fact, that it is surprising that Texas even in-
voked it in this case. The entire breach of peace line of cases since
Cantwell stands for the proposition that the state may prohibit speech
only when onlooker violence beyond police control is imminent.10
92. Id.
93. Texas conceded for the purposes of oral argument that Johnson's conduct was "sym-
bolic speech." Id.
94. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);
95. Cf. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969) (reversing the appellant's conviction
on the ground that he may have been punished for his words).
96. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541. The State's concerns arise "only when a person's treat-
ment of the flag communicates some message." Id. at 2542.
97. Id. at 2542 ("We are thus outside of O'Brien's test altogether.").
98. Id. at 2541.
99. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the facts did not
justify the conviction of the speaker); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (holding that the
facts justified the speaker's conviction when sufficient disruption was shown).
100. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541.
101. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 66-71); see also
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 72-77); Gre-
gory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 84-87).
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Texas' breach of peace argument was a weak one, and the Supreme
Court, like the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, quickly disposed of
it.102 The only evidence Texas could offer of imminent danger to the
public peace was several persons' testimony that the flag burning had
seriously offended them. 103 Quoting Terminiello, the Court declared
that "a function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. Free speech may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with con-
ditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." 1 4 The Court added
that it has not "permitted the Government to assume that every ex-
pression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but [has] instead re-
quired careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding
the expression."'' 5 Unless the State can prove "imminent lawless ac-
tion,"' 6 it may not legitimately argue that it suppressed speech only
to prevent a breach of the peace. 0 7
The Court then ruled that Johnson's expression did not come
within the "fighting words" exception'08 to the right of free expres-
sion since it was not within that small class of fighting words that are
likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, thereby causing a
breach of the peace.'09 Johnson's expression was general, rather than
the direct personal insult required by Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire.10
B. Texas' Second Interest: Preserving the Flag as a National Symbol
Having rejected Texas' attempt to constitutionalize a "heckler's
veto,""' the Supreme Court turned to Texas' second argument, that
102. The Court found it contradictory to conclude both that the offensiveness of the speak-
er's opinion is a reason for according it constitutional protection and that the government may
ban the expression of disagreeable ideas on the presumption that their very disagreeableness will
provoke violence. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
105. Id. at 2542.
106. Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
107. Id.; cf. United States v. Cary, No. 88-5458 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming the conviction of
a flag burner on facts which established that the government had a legitimate interest in preserv-
ing the peace).
108. Under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), inflammatory words of
"personal insult" directed at a specific person are not constitutionally protected.
109. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
110. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. In Chaplinsky, the Court affirmed the conviction of a
speaker who had told a local marshal that he was a "God damned Racketeer" and a "damned
Fascist." Id.
111.* In Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), the Supreme Court reversed the breach of
peace convictions of five African-Americans who had refused a police order to leave a segre-
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the State possessed a legitimate interest in preserving the flag as a
symbol of "nationhood and national unity.""12 The Court first deter-
mined that this asserted interest ran afoul of O'Brien's requirement
that a legitimate government interest in suppressing symbolic conduct
be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression.""' 3 Next, the
Court found that the statute restricted expression based on the expres-
sion's communicative impact and was therefore "content-based" and
unconstitutional under Boos v. Barry."14
In Boos, the Court had examined a statute prohibiting, within 500
feet of a foreign embassy, any sign that "tends to bring that foreign
government into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute." ' "'5 The Boos
Court held that the statute was "content-based" -aimed at the sup-
pression of expression-rather than "content-neutral" -aimed at an
interest legitimately within government control-because the expres-
sion's emotional impact on its audience was not a secondary effect
independent of the expression itself. 1 6 Texas' restriction of Johnson's
expression, like the unconstitutional restriction in Boos, depended
upon the "likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct.""'
Therefore, Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol by shield-
ing citizens from expression derogatory to the flag was subjected to
exacting scrutiny. "8
Texas' interest was bound to fail this test, since the Court's analysis
had exposed the State's purpose in prosecuting Johnson: Texas
deemed the message conveyed by flag burning to be harmful; there-
fore, Texas deemed it suppressible." 9 The Court declared that a state
gated public library. The court noted that orderly demonstrators are "not chargeable with the
danger . . . that their critics might react with disorder or violence." Id. at 133 n.1 (citing KAL-
EN, THE NEGRO AND TmE FIRST AmENDMENT 140-60 (1965) (on "the problem of the 'heckler's
veto."')); see also Stone, Content-Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 215 (1983) (discussing the Supreme Court's "reluctance to accept the 'heckler's
veto').
112. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
113. Id.at2541.
114. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). Boos was a plurality opinion written by Justice O'Conner, with
two justices concurring and five justices concurring in part. Justice Kennedy took no part in the
consideration of the case.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 321.
117. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543 (footnote omitted). Texas argued that its statute's "serious
offense" provision applied to the intent of the desecrator rather than to the reaction of his
audience. Id. at 2543 n.7. However, the Court recognized that at trial Texas had not seen the
distinction between intent and actual communicative impact. Id. The Court found, in any event,
such a distinction "too precious to be of constitutional significance." Id.
118. Id. at 2543 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
119. Id. at 2544; see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 964, 998 (1978) (noting that suppression "to protect people from harms that result
because the listener adopts certain perceptions ... disrespects the responsibility of the listener").
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cannot prosecute for such a purpose, because "[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.' ' 20 The flag, it con-
cluded, is not an exception to this principle. ' 2
Thus Johnson's expressive conduct was protected by decades of
first amendment jurisprudence: given its political context, Johnson's
conduct was clearly symbolic speech, and not subject to an exception
under O'Brien; Johnson did not use "fighting words," which must
bear the character of personal insult, so Chaplinsky did not apply;
and there was neither an explosive crowd reaction nor misbehavior on
Johnson's part that Texas could offer to justify stepping in to prevent
a breach of the peace under Cantwell. The Court concluded that
Texas' actual motivation for prosecuting Johnson was that it simply
did not like what he had to say, and sought to silence him.
Had the Court accepted as valid Texas' interest in preventing a
breach of peace, the statute might have obtained the Cantwell
"breach of peace" exception to Brandenburg's direct incitement re-
quirement.' 22 Had the Court accepted Texas' interest in preserving the
flag as a symbol of national unity, the O'Brien standard, which allows
narrowly-tailored restriction of conduct that frustrates a legitimate
governmental interest, 23 would have applied, again relieving Texas of
the necessity of confronting the Brandenburg limitations. However,
the Supreme Court-like the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals before
it-accepted neither of Texas' asserted interests as a legitimate basis
for prosecuting Johnson.
Justice Kennedy concurred "without reservation," but wrote sepa-
rately to emphasize the "painful" nature of the decision.' 24 Despite
120. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544.
121. Id.
122. Where a serious danger of uncontrollable violence exists, the speaker need not have
urged the mob to commit violence before the government may restrict his speech; rather, he may
be prosecuted if he inflames a mob to the danger point and then refuses a police order to desist
from further speech. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) ("[T]he imminence of
greater disorder coupled with petitioner's deliberate defiance of the police officers convince us
that we should not reverse this conviction in the name of free speech."). But see Gregory v.
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (police may not arrest peaceful and orderly demonstrators who
refuse to disperse); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("[Free speech] may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.").
123. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that government may pro-
scribe expressive conduct where: (1) the regulation falls within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) it furthers a "substantial government interest" unrelated to the suppression of
expression; and (3) the "incidental restriction" on expression is "no greater than is essential" to
the furtherance of the government interest).
124. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the "enormity" of Johnson's offense, Justice Kennedy wrote, the first
amendment dictated that he go free, for "[ilt is poignant but funda-
mental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt." 25
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist set the indignant tone of sub-
sequent critics of the majority opinion. He quoted the entire first
verse of "The Star Spangled Banner,' ' 26 compared flag burning to
"murder, embezzlement, [and] pollution,' '1 27 and quoted line after
line of some of the most unabashedly sentimental poetry our nation
has produced. 12 He chronicled the history of the flag in exhaustive
detail and included a jibe at the "civics lesson" in the majority opin-
ion.' 29 He also paid tribute to the soldiers who have fought under the
flag, and cited veterans' horror at the sacrilege of flag burning. 30 The
Chief Justice would have accepted Texas' interest in protecting the
symbolic value of the flag. After all, he declared, when the govern-
ment enacts flag protection statues, it is "simply recognizing ... the
profound regard for the American flag" that already exists.' 3 ' Chief
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The first verse of the National Anthem is:
Oh! say can you see by the dawn's early light,
What so proudly we hailed at the twighlight's last gleaming?
Whose broad'stripes and bright stars, thro' the perilous fight,
O'er the ramparts we watched were so gallantly streaming?
And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there.
Oh! say does that star-spangled banner yet wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?
Lyrics by Francis Scott Key, melody composed by John Stafford Smith.
127. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting John Greenleaf Whittier's poem,
"Barbara Frietchie": 'Shoot if you must, this old grey head,/But spare your country's flag,'
she said."). One may convincingly argue that this poem about an old woman courageously wav-
ing her flag in the face of a Rebel army is a tribute to the woman, not to the flag. Certainly the
Rebel commander who declined to lock horns with Barbara Frietchie admired her courage, but
since he chose to continue in his rebellion against the United States, he evidently experienced no
change of heart in regard to the flag. Gallantry, not patriotism, won the day for Barbara Fri-
etchie.
129. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist's swipe at the Court's
"regrettably patronizing civics lecture," id., is remarkable in view of the history and poetry
lessons in which his dissent indulges.
130. Id. at 2550-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Some veterans, though, have made it clear
that they do not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist's brand of patriotism. To protest the new
flag protection statute, a group of Vietnam veterans burned 1,000 flags, citing their loyalty to
the first amendment and their opposition to "forced patriotism." Pensacola News J., Oct. 29,
1989, at 3A, col. 1. The veterans' flag burning ceremony was not the only one triggered by the
passage of the flag protection statute. Id.
131. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555.
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Justice Rehnquist also would have accepted Texas' breach of peace
rationale. Comparing flag burning to the "fighting words" a state
may prohibit under Chaplinsky, he declared that flag burning is un-
doubtedly expressive, but, as with fighting words, flag burning is "so
inherently inflammatory that it may cause a breach of public or-
der.' 3 2 Therefore, the states should be permitted to prohibit it.'33
Thus, the Chief Justice would construe Chaplinsky to cover not
only direct personal insult, but also other expression-such as flag
burning-that is "inherently" inflammatory, even when, as in John-
son, no evidence exists that any breach of the peace was actually
threatened.' 34 Perhaps the Chief Justice meant to limit the recom-
mended proscription of "inherently" inflammatory conduct to flag
burning, since the flag, in his view, is not "just another symbol."' 35
However, his broad reading of Chaplinsky would open the door to
prosecution of any expression deemed "inherently" offensive,
whether or not actual danger threatened, thus eviscerating Branden-
burg and returning first amendment jurisprudence to the state that ex-
isted at the time of Schenck and Debs.'36
Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that sanctioning the public
desecration of the flag would "tarnish [the flag's] value-both for
those who cherish the ideas for which it waves and for those who de-
sire to don the robes of martyrdom by burning it.""' Drawing a line
between the message and the medium, he added that the concept of
"desecration" does not turn on the substance of the message the actor
intends to convey, but rather on whether those who view the act will
take serious offense. Johnson does not deal with disagreeable ideas,
he concluded, but rather with disagreeable conduct that diminishes the
value of an "important national asset.' 38
Searching for a legitimate government interest to justify Johnson's
conviction, the dissenting Justices compared burning a flag to defac-
ing the Lincoln Memorial'3 and the Washington Monument.' 4° Yet,
132. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2541.
135. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
136. See supra note 50.
137. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2557. Justice Stevens also invoked the names of Patrick Henry, Susan B. An-
thony, Abraham Lincoln, Nathan Hale, and Booker T. Washington. The invocation of Patrick
Henry's name is ironic, since Henry, an Anti-Federalist, fought to defeat the very Constitution
that the Court now expounds. L. LEVY, Tim ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 107-10 (1986). Henry helped delay Virginia's ratification of the Bill of Rights for
nearly two years. Id. at 86-89.
139. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 587 (1974) (White, J., concurring)).
140. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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even those uninitiated into the legal intricacies regarding expressive
conduct will recognize that this argument is flawed: in protecting
monuments, the government has a legitimate interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech-the cost and trouble of sandblasting.' 4' More-
over, monuments are government property, whereas the government
does not similarly own the innumerable copies of the flag.1 42 The dis-
sent's comparison of a unique public monument to "the" flag simply
does not withstand scrutiny. Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
emphasizing that Gregory Johnson burned a flag "stolen from its
rightful owner ' 143 fails to make a valid point. Theft was not an issue
in this case; Johnson was convicted of desecration. 44Texas would not
necessarily have foregone prosecuting Johnson had he bought the flag
he burned, kept the receipt in his pocket, and produced it for the offi-
cials.
Critics of the Johnson opinion are motivated by ideological anger at
those who do not share their brand of patriotism. These critics, both
judicial and political, 45 have appealed to the hearts of the American
people; the resulting emotionalism has led many people to believe that
an exception to the first amendment should be made. 46 And despite
the Johnson majority's paean to freedom of speech and stated refusal
to "dilute the freedom that [the flag] represents,"'147 the opinion may
141. Ely, supra note 47, at 1504.
142. Id. at 1504-08. Ely has considered the possibility that the State may legitimately assert
an interest in controlling messages conveyed by privately owned flags by invoking a principle
similar to that used in cases where an audience interrupts a speaker; i.e., since the flag conveys a
message, a defacement of it interrupts that message. Ely concluded, however, that such an inter-
est could be analogous only to a law specifically prohibiting the interruption of patriotic
speeches-a law hardly unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Id. at 1508 (footnote
omitted).
143. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2537.
145. The emotional tenor of the dissents to Johnson is unmistakable. See, for example,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's quotation from the National Anthem, id. at 2549 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting), and Justice Steven's invocation of the names of admired Americans, id. at 2557 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting). Politicians' appeals to the emotions are similarly obvious: President Bush
traveled to a powerful symbol of patriotism-the Iwo Jima Memorial-to issue his call for a flag
protection amendment. Atlanta J. & Const., July 1, 1989, at A3, col. 2 [hereinafter Iwo Jima
speech]. Speaking on the same subject, Sen. Robert Dole, Repub., Kan., praised the "young
men who loved the flag and fought to defend it." N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at A16, col. 2.
146. It remains to be seen whether Americans will be willing to sacrifice their rights in order
to silence unpopular dissent. Before the village of Skokie, Illinois, was forced to permit Frank
Collin and his Nazi supporters the right to demonstrate, the citizens were willing to "give up
their own rights rather than see Collin exercise his .... [W]ithin months a group of Jewish war
veterans discovered that they could not demonstrate against Frank Collin because of . . . the
same ordinance which was drafted to stop Collin himself." D. HAMrsN, TIE NAzI/SKoKIE CON-
FLICT: A CIvI. LIBERTIES BATTLE 78-79 (1980) (emphasis in original). A similar danger exists in
the flag protection context.
147. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
888 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:869
have left a loophole large enough to drive a truck-or a flag protec-
tion statute-through.
IV. THE LOOPHOLE IN TExAs v. Jom soN
Footnote three of the opinion contains a loophole arising from two
different sources. ,48 The first is the Court's acknowledgement of Con-
gress' right to prescribe proper treatment of the flag as long as the
prescription stops short of prosecuting those who misuse the flag as a
means of political protest. 49 The second source of the loophole is the
Court's language restricting its holding to the constitutionality of the
Texas statute as applied to Johnson himself. 50 Although Johnson's
expressive conduct was protected, the Court acknowledged in foot-
note three that in some instances the flag might still be protected by
the Texas statute: "the prosecution of a person who had not engaged
in expressive conduct would pose a different case."'' For example,
the Court said, a tired person who drags a flag through the mud
knowing the act could offend others may have "no thought of ex-
pressing any idea."'152 Here is a source of possible confusion as to the
148. Footnote three states:
Although Johnson has raised a facial challenge to Texas' flag-desecration statute, we
choose to resolve this case on the basis of his claim that the statute as applied to him
violates the First Amendment. Section 42.09 regulates only physical conduct with re-
spect to the flag, not the written or spoken word, and although one violates the statute
only if one "knows" that one's physical treatment of the flag will "seriously offend
one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action," Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
42.09(b) (1989), this fact does not necessarily mean that the statute applies only to
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 588, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1254, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (WHITE, J., concurring in
judgment) (statute prohibiting "contemptuous" treatment of flag encompasses only
expressive conduct). A tired person might, for example, drag a flag through the mud,
knowing that this conduct is likely to offend others, and yet have no thought of ex-
pressing any idea; neither the language nor the Texas court's interpretations of the
statute precludes the possibility that such a person would be prosecuted for flag dese-
cration. Because the prosecution of a person who had not engaged in expressive con-
duct would pose a different case, and because we are capable of disposing of this case
on narrower grounds, we address only Johnson's claim that § 42.09 as applied to
political expression like his violates the First Amendment.
Id. at 2538 n.3 (emphasis in original).
149. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547 (emphasis added). Van Alstyne has noted that political
speech [as Johnson's speech surely was] is of "central importance to the functions of the first
amendment." W. VAN AI.STYNE, supra note 2, at 41.
150. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2538 n.3.
151. Id.; see Tribe, supra note 11; Flag Desecration and the Constitution, supra note 11.
152. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2539 n.3. The language of footnote three is inexplicable in view
of the fact that any treatment of the flag communicates an idea. Even if the flag desecrator's
senses are so dulled by fatigue or by mental incompetence that he does not realize what he is
"saying," those who would arrest him clearly understand his "message." That is why they arrest
him.
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ultimate meaning of Johnson: how can anyone tell whether a person
who drags a flag through the mud means to express an idea? Can the
government prosecute if it can establish that the person was only
"tired," or that the person's mental abilities were so altered by insan-
ity, alcohol, or drugs that his actions were unconscious? Or need the
government establish only that it is not prosecuting for any element of
expression? Even a "tired person" who drags a flag through the mud
may be expressing an idea of sorts: he may not believe that the flag
merits the effort required to keep it off the ground. Even this level of
disrespect for the flag is offensive to many Americans. Thus, the flag-
dragger, like Gregory Johnson, could be prosecuted for expressing an
idea that is offensive to other people.
The Johnson opinion thus stopped short of providing a sweeping
protection for flag desecrators. The Court failed to hold that the gov-
ernment cannot punish one who mistreats an established symbol;
rather, it stated that the Texas law was not designed to protect "the
physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances."' Here, the John-
son opinion is reminiscent of Schacht v. United States.5 4 In Schacht,
the Court reversed the conviction of a street actor who had worn a
United States military uniform in an antiwar play which tended to
"discredit the armed forces." ' The Court reasoned that although
prosecution for a tendency to discredit the armed forces was an un-
constitutional restraint on speech,1 6 proscribing the wearing of mili-
tary uniforms without permission was valid. 5 7 The government may,
then, prohibit the wearing of military uniforms-like the flag, a sym-
bol established by the government-as long as the government does
not limit such prohibition to those who don the uniform in protest.
Similarly, the Johnson decision seems to permit Congress to proscribe
misuse of the flag, as long as Congress does not limit such proscrip-
tion to those who use the flag in protest. Thus, by virtue of the limi-
ting language of footnote three, a flag protection statute which stops
short of defining the motive of a flag burner may pass constitutional
muster. 158
153. Id. at 2543.
154. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
155. Id. at 60.
156. Id. at 62-63.
157. Id. at 61.
158. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court wrote that it would not
strike down an otherwise constitutional statute "on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative mo-
tive .... Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter." Id. at 383.
Therefore, Robert Bork's statement that the legislative purpose behind the 1989 flag protection
statute will automatically doom the statute may not be accurate. See Bork, Legal Times, July 24,
1989, at 18.
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Seen in this light, Johnson is more of a compromise between the
two extremes of absolute flag protection and absolute first amend-
ment protection than it is a ringing affirmation of the latter. Until the
Supreme Court clarifies and/or broadens its holding in Johnson, the
government may continue prosecuting flag desecrators while stopping
short of basing the prosecution on the content of the protest. 5 9
Nevertheless, by refusing to allow the government to prosecute, ex-
pressly for political protest communicated through flag misuse, the
Court infuriated those who would protect the flag from those who
would show contempt for it. Ultimately, then, the Court has produced
an opinion which has not proven wholly satisfactory to either of the
contending factions. Indeed, in its effort to walk a blurred and unten-
able line between protection of the flag and protection of expression,
the Court may have created an ironic legal situation in which a mother
grieving for a son killed in combat can be prosecuted for pinning his
medals to the flag. 160 The absurdity of such a prosecution illustrates
the obvious: the Court cannot rationally protect the physical integrity
of the flag while banning prosecution for ideas expressed through
treatment of it.
It is highly unlikely, though, that a police officer would arrest the
grieving mother. The officer is far more likely to arrest the flag-burn-
ing political dissident. Thus, if the new flag protection statute passes
constitutional scrutiny, we are back to square one: only those who
mutilate the flag to express an offensive idea are likely to be prose-
cuted. In Spence v. Washington,161 the Court did not reach the appel-
lant's argument that the flag protection statute under which he was
convicted was overbroad; the Court did note, though, that the statute
had a limitless sweep that forbade, among other things, a veterans'
159. As of this writing, two federal district courts have declared prosecutions under the new
flag protection statute unconstitutional. See United States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. 1123
(D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash.), prob. juris. noted,
United States v. Haggerty, No. 89-1434 (1990).
160. Cong. Q., Oct. 7, 1989, at 2646, col. 3 (remarks of Sen. Robert Dole, Repub., Kan.).
161. 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.9 (1974). The government's argument that the new flag protection
statute is content-neutral has failed in both prosecutions under the statute. In Haggerty, 731 F.
Supp. at 415, the Senate argued that the statute is content-neutral because "it protects the physi-
cal integrity of the flag . . . regardless of the actor's intent." Id. at 419. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington replied that such is not the definition of
content-neutrality: "[ilf the justification for protecting the flag is related to the suppression of
expression, it is not content-neutral even though the Act on its face is applicable to anyone who
engages in certain conduct regardless of the actor's intent or the impact of the conduct." Id. at
420. In Eichman, 731 F. Supp. at 1123, the court responded similarly to the same argument: "[a]
regulation is not content-neutral ... merely because on the face of the statute the same rules
apply to everyone." Id. at 1129.
19901 FLAG BURNING
group to attach battallion commendations to a United States flag. 62
Such breadth, said the Court, suggests "problems of selective enforce-
ment."1 63 The new flag protection statute suggests the same problems.
V. CONTROVERSY, CONFUSION, AND THE NEW FLAG PROTECTION
STATUTE
The Supreme Court's legal rationale for protecting flag burning as
political dissent provided no comfort to Americans who favor prohib-
iting the mode of expression chosen by Gregory Johnson.64 The poli-
ticians responded to the public's outrage by passing a federal statute
which bans the physical mutilation of the flag. 65 A movement is also
afoot to amend the Constitution itself in order to reverse the Court
once and for all.' 66 This crusade is presently stalled, despite attempts
by diehards like Senator Robert Dole to jump-start it. 167 Despite the
serious implications inherent in amending the Constitution to limit the
first amendment freedom of speech, some politicians imply that they
may join the push for an amendment if the new statute does not effec-
tivly ban flag desecration. 61
162. Spence, 418 U.S. at 414 n.9.
163. Id.
164. These Americans are not the first to be refused the privilege of silencing those whose
views are repulsive to them. The fury and frustration at flag burning, while understandable, is
no more compelling than the outrage of Holocaust survivors who had to accept the first amend-
ment right of a splinter group of American Nazis to demonstrate in the survivors' home town.
See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 I11. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21
(1978). Nor is it more compelling than the discomfort of Blacks and Jews, who must tolerate the
speeches of the Ku Klux Klan. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
165. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-31, 103 U.S.C. __ . See supra note 12
for the relevant text of the statute.
At least one commentator accused the Democrats sponsoring the statute of being desperate to
catch up to Republicans in the "patriotism game." Troxler, Palm Tree Politics, Tampa Tribune,
Oct. 16, 1989, at BI, col. 1. Another charged that politicians are "frightened to death" of voting
against a flag protection statute or amendment. Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 13, 1989, at 17A,
col. 1 (remark of Arthur Kropp, president, People for the American Way).
166. Robert Bork maintains that only a constitutional amendment will effectively protect the
flag. See Bork, supra note 158, at 17-18 (testimony of Robert Bork to the House Judiciary Sub-
committee). Charles J. Cooper, former head of the legal counsel office in the Department of
Justice, believes that any statute will be struck down by the Supreme Court, especially if it in-
cludes an exception for disposal with "love and respect" when a flag is torn or soiled. Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 33, col. 2.
President Bush called for a flag protection amendment in a speech given in front of the monu-
ment memorializing the flag-raising on Iwo Jima. See Iwo Jima speech, supra note 145.
167. The Flag Protection Amendment was defeated in the Senate by a roll-call vote of 51-48
on October 19, 1989. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at A16, col. 2. Sen. Dole, Repub., Kan.,
vowed to "stick with" "hardworking people" who want the amendment. Id. at col. 3.
168. Sen. Joseph Biden Jr., Dem., Del., noted that the constitutional remedy is available
even if the statute is ineffective. Cong. Q., October 7, 1989, at 2649, col. 3. Rep. Chuck Doug-
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The most palatable argument of the statute's supporters-since it at
least recognizes a first amendment right to expression-is that denying
the right to protest by such flamboyant and offensive means as flag
burning does not close all avenues of dissent. 69 Robert Bork, for ex-
ample, argued before the House Judiciary Subcommittee that
"[s]imply ... putting out of bounds a few means of expression in no
way threatens the American system of freedom of speech.' '1 70 Bork
compared the Johnson holding to a proscription of the government's
power to "punish such actions as ... expressing a political viewpoint
from a sound truck at two o'clock in the morning in a residential
neighborhood."'71 Such overstatement ignores the O'Brien exception,
which permits the State to prohibit conduct for a legitimate state in-
terest unrelated to the suppression of speech. 72 The State's interest in
preserving the right of its citizens to sleep at night is unrelated to any
desire to prevent the expression of ideas.
Justice Harlan espoused this "alternative mode of expression" doc-
trine in his concurrence to O'Brien: "O'Brien manifestly could have
conveyed his message in many ways other than by burning his draft
card.' 1 73 This opinion is notably at odds with Justice Harlan's major-
ity opinion protecting dissident expression in Cohen v. California.174
las, Repub., N.H., a proponent of the amendment, declared that "[t]hose who vote against the
amendment are only delaying the pain. It's going to be back, and it will either be back next year
or the year after." Tallahassee Democrat, October 13, 1989, at A17, col. 3.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington's decision in United
States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990), which struck down the Flag Protection
Act, renewed calls for a constitutional amendment to prohibit flag misuse. Squitieri, USA To-
day, Feb. 23, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
169. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2553 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that Johnson was denied only one of many means of symbolic speech). Justice Stevens found
that requiring protesters to choose an alternative mode of expression is but a "trivial burden" on
expression. Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist declared in his dissent
that Johnson's actions conveyed nothing that could not have been conveyed just as forcefully in
a dozen different ways. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. Bork, supra note 158, at 17.
171. Id.
172. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
173. Id. at 389 (Harlan, J., concurring).
174. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). It is difficult to reconcile Justice Harlan's conflicting views in
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 389, and Cohen. In Cohen, he wrote that the Court addressed only "a
conviction resting solely upon speech, not upon any separately identifiable conduct." Cohen,
403 U.S. at 18.
Three Justices, Burger, C.J., Black and Blackmun, JJ., dissented. Id. at 27. Justice Blackmun
stated, "Cohen's absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Black joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1968), Justice Black made it clear that in his view,
prosecution for flag burning does not violate the first amendment. Id. at 610 (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
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Nowhere in Cohen did Justice Harlan write that the dissident should
have been required to choose a means of expression other than wear-
ing a patently offensive message on his jacket. Rather, he wrote that
"[w]e cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous
of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard
for that emotive junction which, practically speaking, may often be
the more important element of the overall message sought to be com-
municated." 175
In decriminalizing Cohen's mode of expression, the Court cited the
"premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests,"' 7 6 and noted, memorably, that "one man's vulgarity is
another man's lyric." 7 7 Flag burning, like wearing a jacket imprinted
with an obscenity, is undoubtedly socially unacceptable to a great
number of Americans; however, the focus should not be upon the rel-
ative popularity of the idea. What may appear to one person to be an
act of destruction may appear to another person to be an ideological
act of creation. 178
Johnson's act assured attention to his expression precisely because
it was outrageous. 179 Chief Justice Rehnquist's characterization of flag
burning as an "inarticulate" form of protest18 0 is belied by the fact
that Johnson's "inarticulate" form of protest has been noted, re-
marked upon, and fought over in newspapers and living rooms across
the nation as well as in the Congress and the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In the last analysis, though, successful prosecution under the new
statute depends upon whether the Court finds the law content-neutral
or content-based.' 8' At this writing, the battle between first amend-
175. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
176. Id. at 24.
177. Id. at 25.
178. "A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's
comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
179. The same reasoning applies to any form of flamboyant protest. O'Brien's draft card
burning, for example, gained much of its effectiveness because it was illegal. Ely, supra note 47,
at 1489. If O'Brien had merely stated his opposition to the draft, he would have received as
much notice as Johnson would have had he simply said that the Reagan administration was
corrupt; as Cohen would have had he worn the words "I disapprove of the draft" on his jacket;
as the Boston patriots would have had they stood at Boston Harbor wearing signs that said,
"We don't like being under the economic control of England."
180. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2554 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
The United States House of Representatives argued in United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp.
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ment absolutists and flag protectors is on hold, as the nation awaits
the Supreme Court's decision on the 1989 flag protection statute. Be-
fore amending the statute, Congress provided criminal punishment for
"[w]hoever knowingly casts contempt" upon any United States
flag.182 Evidently Congress hoped that the removal of these emotive
words in the amended statute would render the statute content-neu-
tral, and thus constitutional. The game apparently is one of seman-
tics. 183
But word games are unlikely to render the flag desecration statute
content-neutral, for content neutrality is a substantive, rather than
merely a verbal, concept. For example, the Court found the ordinance
at issue in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. to be content neutral. 8 4
The ordinance was found to be aimed not at the content of films
shown in adult theatres, but at the secondary effects such theatres
would have on the surrounding business and residential community. 8 1
Thus the Court held that the Renton regulation, like the statute at
issue in O'Brien,16 accomplished a legitimate government objective
and did not merely suppress speech.
In contrast, the Court found the statute at issue in Boos v. Barry8 7
unconstitutional because it permitted prosecution based on the speech
content of the signs it proscribed. As stated previously, the principles
of Boos defeated the Texas statute in Johnson: Texas' law was in-
415 (W.D. Wash. 1990), that the government's purpose, unrelated to expression, was to "shield
the flag from harm as an incident of sovereignty." The court responded that, since use of the
flag to indicate sovereignty is itself a symbolic use, flag misuse is also expressive conduct since it
shows disrespect for that sovereignty. Id. at 420.
In United States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990), the government advanced the
interest of protecting the flag "for everyone's use and no one's destruction." The court noted,
though, that if the government wished only to protect the flag as a symbol of "something," then
its interest was not even implicated when a protestor destroyed the flag, since the protestor's use
of it was part and parcel of what the government claimed to protect. Id. at 1129. The court
added, though, that the government's "true purpose" is to "preserve the flag as a symbol only
for those who would not damage or destroy it." Id. Such an interest is invalid, for it entails
proscription of dissent. Id.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968) (emphasis added).
183. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Dem., Del., worried that the the word "defiles" "connotes
that there is a communicative, a verbal injury that you can inflict upon someone or something."
Cong. Q., Oct. 7, 1989, at 2646, col. 1. Before the word "defiles" was added on the Senate
floor, the statute was tailored as carefully as possible to adhere to the standards announced in
Johnson. Id.
184. 475 U.S. 41, 44 (1986). The ordinance, Resolution No. 2368, imposed a moratorium on
the licensing of "any business . . . which . . . has as its primary purpose the selling, renting or
showing of sexually explicit materials." Id.
185. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
186. See Universal Military Training and Services Act, 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1988) (prohib-
iting the burning of draft cards).
187. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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tended to regulate conduct that "seriously offends" others; S a court
may not consider the impact of the expression unrelated to the expres-
sion itself.8 9 The new flag protection statute makes no reference to
the reaction of onlookers, if the emotive impact of the word
"defiles"' 9 is discounted. 19' Nevertheless, this omission alone proba-
bly does not guarantee the success of any prosecution under the stat-
ute. According to Boos, O'Brien, and Renton, a simple omission of
any mention of the expression's impact upon others is not enough; the
law must have some effect unrelated to the suppression of expression.
It is virtually impossible to conceive of any potential purpose of a flag
protection statute other than regulation of the content of the message
the flag conveys. 192
To those who believe that the coexistence of protections for both
interests-the physical integrity of the flag and freedom of expres-
sion-is constitutionally possible, the logical answer is that it is legal
sophistry to suggest that prosecution for flag desecration could be un-
related to prosecution of any idea expressed thereby. Flag desecration
is clearly an insult to the nation. An insult is expression. That fact is
irrebuttable. Since the flag itself is a symbol, any treatment of it is
necessarily symbolic, and communicates an idea. 93 Certainly, those
who would protect the mother who pins her son's medals to the flag
yet jail the dissident who burns it must admit outright that they are
prosecuting for expression. 194
188. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1969); see supra note 19 for the relevant
text of the statute.
189. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989) (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
190. The inclusion of this word worried Senator Joseph Biden Jr., Dem., Del., the sponsor
of the statute. See supra note 183. For the text of the statute, see supra note 12.
191. See Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-103, 103 Stat. - (amending 18
U.S.C. 700). See supra note 12 for the relevant text of the statute.
192. Peihaps prosecutors will advance the argument that the State has an interest in conserv-
ing cloth and the red, white, and blue dye. These are, after all, the physical components of the
flag. Erwin N. Griswold, former Solicitor General and former dean of the Harvard Law School,
says that he tried "very hard" to write a flag protection statute that would not threaten first
amendment values, but failed. Cong. Q., Sept. 2, 1989, at 2255.
193. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943) (the flag is a
"short cut from mind to mind"); see also Iwo Jima speech, supra note 145, at col. 2 ("This flag
is one of our most important ideas. If it is not defended, it is defamed.") (emphasis added).
194. Walter Berns argues that the founders' view of which ideas to protect was limited. W.
BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 144 (1976). Berns
fears that cultivation of virtues necessary to successful self-government "is not readily accom-
plished in a liberal democracy, and it cannot even be attempted until the Supreme Court is per-
suaded to forgo its doctrinaire attachment to 'freedom of expression' and to complete separation
of religion and state." Id. at 237; see also Meese, The Moral Foundations of Republican Gov-
ernment, in STILL =HE LAW OF THE LAND? ESSAYS ON CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CON-
STITUTION 63-77 (McNamara & Rothe eds. 1987). Meese charges that "secular liberalism often
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are, then, at least three problems left in the wake of Johnson:
the problem of interpreting the opinion, as evidenced by the scholarly
debate over how (not to mention whether) the ruling can be circum-
vented; 95 the frightening possibility that dissenters who burn the flag
can still be punished under Johnson, at least if the government is cun-
ning enough to craft its reasons for prosecution narrowly; and the
ironic fact that the prosecution of a mother who pins her son's medals
to the flag must remain possible on the face of any statute that can
ban flag mutilation and still have a chance, however slim, of receiving
affirmation from the Supreme Court. All three problems stem from
the Court's failure to state unequivocally that the government of a
free people has no legitimate business in establishing symbols for
which the government in any way may compel respect. 96 Such a ruling
would protect mother and dissenter-not to mention any hapless tired
person who should happen to drag a flag through the mud-from
prosecution. Such a ruling also would be consistent with the philoso-
phy underlying West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. 97 In
Barnette, the Court held that the individual is free not to take part in
prescribed rituals surrounding government-established symbols.'9
Recognizing the dignity of the individual, the Court declared that the
driven by the expansive egalitarian impulse has threatened . . . to blow out the moral lights
around us." Id. at 75.
Berns and Meese seem quite confident that they know these "moral lights" when they see
them. Robert Bork seems similarly confident; he would protect only that speech perceived by the
majority as political truth. See generally Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Bork would permit suppression of speech that has "no political
value within a republican system of government." Id. at 33. For example, speech advocating
violent overthrow of the government would not be "political speech," because it has no value in
the Madisonian system of government approved by Bork. Id. at 31.
195. See supra notes 165-66.
196. It can be persuasively argued that the Court has already said this, in Barnette. See supra
note 13; see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (The State cannot prosecute
for failure to "show proper respect for our national emblem."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 593 (1968).
197. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Writing during World War II, when the world was forced to con-
front the harsh realities of fascism, the Court couched its opinion in terms of the ideal of free
choice for the individual. While the Court did not question "[niational unity as an end which
officials may foster by persuasion and example," id. at 640, it remained cognizant of the evils of
the coerced unity of the "totalitarian enemies" of the United States, id. at 641. "Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard," the Court declared, add-
ing that the American Constitution was designed to avoid such danger. Id. Moreover, the Court
stated that "freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order." Id. at 642. The first amendment was meant, the Court said, to
reserve from all official control the "sphere of intellect and spirit." Id.
198. Id.
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Bill of Rights "grew in soil which also produced the philosophy that
the individual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable
through mere absence of government restraint."199
The Supreme Court's opinion in Texas v. Johnson, however, lacks
the vision that permeates Barnette. It does not dwell on the ideal that
the individual is the "center of society" 2° and has a natural right "to
be let alone ' 20' by the government. Instead, the Johnson opinion
dwells upon the power that accrues to the majority when it tolerates
criticism-"our toleration of criticism is a sign and source of our
strength" ;202 the opinion appeals to majority prejudice when it re-
minds us that Johnson's gesture is unlikely to change our minds about
our flag;20 3 and it exhorts us to "persuade [flag desecrators] that they
are wrong.''204 Such language is like the siren's song: attractive, be-
cause we all like to believe that we have found the "truth," 205 and
dangerous, because we may cease to tolerate "wrong" ideas when we
begin to perceive them as a threat to that "truth. ' ' 20 A focus upon the
199. Id. at 639.
200. Id.
201. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
202. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. A majority's assumption that it has found the "truth" is an incredibly arrogant as-
sumption of infallibility, as well as a convenient justification for suppression. Both the "liberty"
and the "skepticism" approaches to first amendment jurisprudence eschew such an assumption.
For a full discussion of the liberty theory and its superiority to the "marketplace of ideas" and
"market failure" models, see generally Baker, supra note 119. For a comprehensive treatment of
the skepticism model, see generally Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of
Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MIC. L. Rav. 1564 (1988). The skepticism and liberty theories
diverge slightly in their focus: skepticism focuses primarily upon the inability of any group legiti-
mately to declare truth. See Gey, supra, at 1624. The liberty theory focuses upon the natural
right of the individual to declare his version of truth freely without fear of reprisals by the State.
See Baker, supra note 119, at 966. Still, the end result of these approaches is the same: the
government has no legitimate right to impose given "truths" upon the populace. Such given
truths include symbols that represent those truths, such as the flag.
The expansive freedom that would be conferred by these models is hardly a product of twenti-
eth century radicalism. John Stuart Mill wrote in 1859 that "[all silencing of discussion is an
assumption of infallibility." Mill, On Liberty, in PROSE OF THE VICTORIAN PERIOD 251-53 (W.
Buckler ed. 1958). "Those who desire to suppress [an opinion] of course deny its truth; but they
are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind." Id. Mill's
statement bears more than a passing resemblance to Gey's explication of skepticism, which is
characterized by a suspicion of "state endorsed certainty as the basis for regulating expression."
Gey, supra, at 1624; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes and Bran-
deis, JJ., dissenting) ("[Tihe only meaning of free speech is that [ideas] should be given their
chance and have their way.").
206. "[Tlolerance theory breaks down once it accepts that the state can identify and protect
a set of essential moral verities. It is inevitable that a state in that situation will abandon the
tolerance theory when its moral essence is threatened." Gey, supra note 205, at 1620.
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individual's right to self expression, rather than upon the tolerance of
dissent in order to preserve the status quo, forestalls this danger. 20 7
Moreover, a belief that the founding fathers refused to grant the
British government the right to foist the Union Jack upon them, 28 but
reserved to themselves the right to foist the flag of their choosing upon
others, does no honor to the founders. Their collective view of liberty
was expansive,2°9 and they left to each of us the decision whether to
embrace or discard any and all ideas and symbols. That Gregory John-
son exercised his freedom to discard the flag and everything it repre-
sents is Gregory Johnson's business. 210 It is not ours, for he is unable to
destroy the flag for the rest of us. He burned only one copy of a mate-
rial manifestation of ideals to which we are as free as ever to adhere.
But the deliberate weakening of the freedom of expression by the
government itself is everyone's business. Unlike Gregory Johnson, the
government has the physical-if not the constitutional-power to co-
erce every citizen in the United States. Only by refusing to exercise that
power to crush individual differences can the government remain true
to the ideals that gave it its existence.
207. "Liberties in a nation-any nation-are constantly in jeopardy .... Frequently, free-
doms are threatened or denied by those in government, in associations, or individuals in society,
who act in the belief that they are preserving democracy." R. CORD, PROTEST, DISSENT AND THE
SUPRME COURT 1 (1971). The "market place of ideas" theory, with its focus on the ultimate
good of society, falls short of providing the protection necessary against such danger, for it
diverts attention from the right of the individual to speak. Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5. Baker would place the focus on individual right:
"Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of the value of speech
conduct to the individual." Baker, supra note 119, at 966.
208. In Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2546 (1989), the Court commented upon the
founders' lack of reverence for the Union Jack. Id. at 2546. The Court might also have com-
mented upon the founders' lack of reverence for any government that infringed upon basic liber-
ties. At least one of the founders-Thomas Jefferson-threatened nullification when Congress
passed the Alien and Sedition Laws. W. BERNS, supra note 194, at 104. As Berns observes, no
one should be surprised at Jefferson's radical threat; after all, he had already participated
wholeheartedly in the dissolution of one union. Id.
209. "Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty." Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
210. We have neither a constitutional nor a moral right to silence his dissent. "If all man-
kind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, man-
kind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind." Mill, supra note 205, at 252. Mill's defense of individ-
ual autonomy is as valid today as it was in 1859. Ingber urges the United States legal system to
expand its limited adoption of Mill's theory: "Instead of merely embracing [Mill's] theory of the
liberty of thought and discussion, our courts should emphasize his view of limited societal au-
thority over the individual, a theory of freedom of conduct." Ingber, supra note 207, at 86-87
(emphasis added). "[W]e may have done too little to free the hearts of men and women so that
we can live in an open society and not merely talk of it." Id. at 91 (emphasis in original) (foot-
note omitted).
